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June 2009
CHINA’S MARITIME QUEST
Dr. David Lai
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) turned 60 on April 23, 2009. China
held an unprecedented celebration on this occasion. For the first time in its history, China
invited foreign navies to the PLAN’s birthday event. Chinese President Hu Jintao and all
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) senior leaders reviewed a parade of China’s major
warships from a Chinese destroyer. The column of PLAN vessels were headed by two
nuclear-powered and armed submarines (the first-ever public appearance of China’s
strategic submarine fleet) and 21 warships from 14 nations, including major naval powers
such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France. The parade took place
off the coast of Qingdao, the PLAN Beihai (northern seas) Fleet Headquarters. In addition,
China invited many foreign navy chiefs, most notably the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
and the Russian Navy Commander, as well as over 200 foreign military and navy attachés
to the party.
The PLAN birthday celebration was like an Olympic meeting for the international
navies. Yet behind the smiling faces, the world saw an ambitious Chinese navy eager to
edge its way to the center stage of world maritime affairs. Indeed, as PLAN Rear Admiral
Yang Yi, a senior strategic analyst at the PLA National Defense University, noted, “the
parade is not just about showing China’s accomplishments, it is more of a new start
signaling where China needs to go in the future.”1 Yang did not have time to elaborate on
his thoughts at the PLAN birthday party, but he and many other noted Chinese analysts
have in recent years put forward an urgent agenda for China’s maritime power.
At the strategic level, China has raised the stakes of its need for great maritime power as
a precondition for its becoming a full-fledged global power. The Chinese argue that all
global powers are also strong maritime powers. Therefore China must follow suit.
Moreover, China’s quest for maritime power will be broad and comprehensive, going
beyond the scope defined by Alfred Thayer Mahan more than a century ago. A powerful
navy is still the first and foremost component. China must have a navy commensurate with
its growing national power. This means upgrading the PLAN to a top-ranked world-class
naval power, the threshold of which, as the Chinese see it, is the possession of aircraft
carrier battle groups and long-range power projection capabilities. There has been a
national debate on the pros and cons of aircraft carriers since the Taiwan Strait crisis of
1995-96 (when the Chinese were furious with the arrival of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle

groups to check China’s dealing with Taiwan). The debate is clearly settled. In recent
months, Chinese officials have gone on record to state that China has good reasons to
acquire aircraft carriers and the world should not be surprised at their decision. China
understands that aircraft carrier capability is an expensive undertaking in construction as
well as in operation, but having had 30 years of phenomenal economic development and
further development carefully planned well into the mid-21st century, China is confident
that it can afford to run this business. There are already calls for China to openly launch its
aircraft carrier construction project. China may be happy to comply.
The second component of China’s maritime power will be a world-class seaborne
merchant fleet to meet the nation’s growing demand for trade and resources supply. Since
becoming the “world manufacture center,” China has greatly expanded its seaborne
transportation; after all, over 90 percent of China’s trade and resources supply go by sea.
Already China is among the world’s top
seaborne transport holders—it has the
world’s fourth largest merchant fleet and
third largest shipbuilding industry; runs
the heaviest container port traffic; and has
five of the world’s ten busiest seaports.
China wants to continue this advance and
develop a blue-water navy to protect these
“life supply facilities.”
The third part of China’s maritime
power will cover all of its ocean interests,
long-claimed (the disputed islands and the
entire South China Sea) as well as those
expanded by the UN Law of the Sea Treaty
(LOST). These include the 200 nautical
miles of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)
and Extended Continental Shelves (ECS).
The claimed area is about 3 million square
kilometers, as indicated by the blue line
circling area in Figure 1.
However, this claim complicates
China’s old disputes with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei and brings
China new enemies, the two Koreas and Indonesia. All of them are also members of the
LOST and entitled to claim their share of the pie (see the overlapping claims in the South
China Sea shown in Figure 2. Additionally, China has to settle the Taiwan issue with the
United States.
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In recent years, there have been
many confrontations between China
and its ocean neighbors. Japan,
Vietnam, the Philippines and
Malaysia have all stepped up their
measures to reinforce their claims
on the disputed islands. The
Chinese were very upset that their
ocean neighbors were taking
advantage of China’s restraint to
encroach upon its claimed ocean
territories. (China’s central focus
has been on Taiwan and its conflict
avoidance approach was taken to
maintain a peaceful environment
for its economic development). In
the last several months, China and
the United States have clashed over
U.S. surveillance vessels in China’s
claimed EEZs in the South China Sea and Yellow Sea. The United States insisted that its
vessels were making “innocent passages” in international waters. China argued that
innocent passages should not include “unauthorized” surveillance activities. All of these
contested acts put much urgency in China’s determination to secure its maritime interests,
and more pointedly, on the need to have a powerful navy to protect its interests.
Chinese President Hu Jintao called for the building of “harmonious ocean” at the PLAN
birthday party. Ironically, the parade of force brought to mind the old saying that if you
want peace, prepare for war. Indeed, China’s ocean neighbors are watching China’s moves
closely. They are also spending more to strengthen their own naval forces. China’s quest for
maritime power will eventually alter the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. Until
China and its ocean neighbors settle their disputes, there will not be harmony and peace in
the Asia Pacific Ocean.
ENDNOTE
1. China Daily, April 27, 2009.
*****
The views expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
This opinion piece is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
Organizations interested in reprinting this or other SSI opinion pieces should contact the Publications
Department via e-mail at SSI_Publishing@conus.army.mil. All organizations granted this right must
include the following statement: “Reprinted with permission of the Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter,
U.S. Army War College.”

3

